Introduction and Motivation
Latin America has been known for its high economic inequality and poor macroeconomic performance, and also for a particular propensity to ‡irt between political dictatorships and more democratic institutions. For instance, in the 1980s, after a spell of dictatorships, a number of Latin American countries re-democratised (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru, to mention a few). However, almost immediately after this process of political liberalisation had taken place, high in ‡ation and even severe bursts of hyperin ‡ation also happened in those countries. Macroeconomic stabilisation took some time to take root in the region. In fact, stabilisation came only after a considerable ten-year delay in the 1990s.
With data for Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia from 1970 to 2007, periods of political dictatorship, re-democratisation, high in ‡ation, hyperin ‡ation, and then …nally macroeconomic stabilisation are captured. We test for the populist view of in ‡ation in Latin America, which predicts that in countries with high economic inequality that re-democratise, the coalition coming into power will try to [re] distribute income from the rich to the poor. However, this is usually done through higher and unfunded public de…cits, or wage and salary increases, which in turn generate higher in ‡ation and macroeconomic instability, and this is known to be detrimental to the welfare of the poor 1 .
The empirical results suggest that during the period of political dictatorship in ‡ation was lower, which indicates that the implementation of democracy seen in the 1980s was, in fact, detrimental to macroeconomic stability. Therefore, the evidence allows us to speculate that the recently elected governments in those countries pursued populist, or the so-called
[re] distributive, policies that eventually led to poor macroeconomic performance through very high rates of in ‡ation and even hyperin ‡ation.
The contribution of this paper is that, …rstly, we focus on understanding the hyperin ‡ationary bursts in Latin American countries right after re-democratisation. This entails a disaggregation of the data to pinpoint more accurately the impact of democracy on hyperin ‡ation. Secondly, we construct a political index based on principal components analysis, which extracts the common factors of di¤erent political regime variables, and that gives a proxy for political regime characteristics with more explanatory power. Thirdly, we make use of the relatively novel panel time-series analysis that deals with interesting empirical issues such as non-stationarity, heterogeneity bias in dynamic panels, economic endogeneity and betweencountry dependence, issues not covered by the previous studies, and which are therefore believed to improve on previous estimates.
The remainder of this paper is as follows: the next subsection brie ‡y reviews and inserts this paper within the previous literature. Section 2 describes the data and the empirical strategy used, and then reports and discusses the results. Section 3 concludes; it summarises the work, and suggests some policy implications and also future work. Paldam (1987) presents some early evidence, which does not take into account the hyperin ‡ationary bursts of the 1990s, that suggests that civilian governments tend to generate higher in ‡ation than military ones in Latin America; and Sachs (1989) , and Dornbusch and Edwards (1990) descriptively highlight the issue of recently elected governments pursuing redistributive populist policies in Latin America in the 1980s. Alesina and Drazen (1991) suggest that in more 'polarised'societies, or in societies with higher income inequality, stabilisations are delayed, (i.e. stabilisations come only after some 'political consolidation'takes place, or after an agreement on which group pays for the stabilisation is reached). This is important for the Latin American case, not only because it presents high income inequality, but also because, roughly speaking, stabilisation came only after a ten-year delay following the implementation of democracy. Alternatively, Cukierman et al. (1992) suggest that more homogeneous societies rely less on seigniorage, and Veiga (2000) provides evidence that in more fragmented societies, or societies with a large number of political parties in congress, stabilisations are delayed. The latter is also related to the Latin American experience right after re-democratisation in which the number of political parties was by far higher than ten years after re-democratisation, which suggests that political fragmentation has been reduced over time, or 3 alternatively, that a process of political consolidation with less, but more structured political coalitions, have been taking place in the region.
Related Literature
Moreover, Beetsma and Van der Ploeg (1996) argue that in excessively unequal societies, and Latin America …ts the bill again, the government tries to please the median voter, or the poor in this case, via redistribution 2 . Desai, et al. (2003) suggest that it all depends on how unequal a country is (i.e. democratisation taking place in unequal countries lead to populist policies and hence high in ‡ation, which is the case in some Latin American countries). Furthermore, Desai et al. (2005) , suggest that inequality a¤ects in ‡ation, but conditional on the political structure 3 .
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen (2003) suggest that distortionary macroeconomic policies that retard economic growth (e.g. in terms of high in ‡ation), are symptoms of 'weak institutions', or not properly constrained executives. Furthermore, Acemoglu, Johnson and Querubín (2008) suggest that policy reforms are only successful when the 'political context' is right (e.g. Zimbabwe implemented central bank independence in 1995, however it has been plagued with hyperin ‡ation since 1999 when the constraints on the executive were severely curtailed). Finally, Dutt and Mitra (2008) suggest that excessive inequality leads to political instability, which in turn leads to policy volatility, and therefore lower investment and economic growth.
All in all, the literature suggests that the implementation of democracy in developing countries should be accompanied not only by the 'right political context', or well-constrained executives, but also by the right economic institutions (e.g. sound …scal and monetary policies conducted by a responsible and independent treasury and central bank respectively). All the same, the 'right political context'and the right economic institutions should move together in this context, so that the costs of delayed stabilisations could be somehow avoided.
This seems to be the case in Latin America (i.e. a re-democratisation process in an unequal region without much political maturity, at least in terms of number of political parties in Congress during and after democratisation, and also without the necessary economic institutions in place-…scal rules and central-bank independence came only towards the end of the 1990s-resulted in a long spell of macroeconomic instability in the region, with all its costs to economic welfare) 4 .
Data, Empirical Strategy, and Results
The data set used covers the period between 1970 and 2007, and four Latin American countries, namely Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Bolivia (i.e. T = 37 and N = 4). The data on in ‡ation (INFLAT) come from the Bureaux of Census of the four countries. The normalised political variables that we use come from the Polity IV data set, which is compiled and provided by the Centre for Global Policy, and they are: democracy (DEMOC), which ranges from 0 (a more democratic country) to 1 (a less democratic one); constraints on the executive (XCONST), which ranges from 0 (a more constrained executive) to 1 (a less constrained one); and political competition (P OLCOM P ), which ranges from 0 (more political competition) to 1 (less political competition).
With the above information we can, via spectral decomposition, use principal components analysis to extract the common factors, or the linear combinations, of these three normalised Polity IV variables, so that we end up with a proxy for political regime characteristics (P OLIT Y ) which contributes to reduce omitted variable problems, or model uncertainty, and which presents more explanatory power. This is potentially important because in this case we are able to reduce the dimensionality of a set of prospective political variables, and we end up with one variable, P OLIT Y , that contains most of the information coming from di¤erent candidates for political regime characteristics.
The control variables used include the government's share of the real gross domestic product (GOV), the ratio of exports and imports over the real gross domestic product (OPEN), the growth rate of the real gross domestic product (GROWTH), and the liquid liabilities over the real gross domestic product (M 2), which are all provided by the Penn World Table ( PWT) data set mark 6.3 and World Development Indicators respectively. Table One presents the correlation matrix, so that we can have an initial insight on the behaviour of the data; and what can be seen initially is that both political regime variables used, i.e. DEMOC and P OLIT Y present negative correlations with in ‡ation. This tentatively suggests that when these countries re-democratised in the 1980s, or when the variables for political regime characteristics decreased in size, macroeconomic performance deteriorated in terms of in ‡ation rates.
The control GOV presents the expected positive correlation with in ‡ation, i.e. bigger governments tend to generate higher in ‡ation, and OP EN , GROW T H and M 2 present the expected negative signs against the in ‡ation rates. This is because it is believed that more economically open societies, and countries that grow faster and which possess a more developed …nancial system tend to present a more stable macroeconomic environment. In addition, and for the sake of clarity, we plot the data on in ‡ation and political regime characteristics in each country separately. Each panel of Figure One illustrates the fact that when those countries re-democratised in the 1980s, illustrated by a reduction in the indices of political regime characteristics, the in ‡ation rates increased considerably shortly after. Moreover, it is also seen that macroeconomic stabilisation took roughly ten years after re-democratisation to take root in the region. Therefore, this initial inspection of the data, with all its caveats, suggests that the process of political liberalisation taking place in the 1980s was followed by very high rates of in ‡ation in the region. Moreover, stabilisation was clearly delayed, i.e. it came only well after the …rst civilian presidents came into o¢ ce, with the implementation of certain stabilisation plans and other economic institutions. (2002). However, this test assumes parameter homogeneity, and therefore does not consider a possible heterogeneity bias present in the data. 6 The Mean Group estimator, proposed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) , is also an alternative. However, this estimator is sensitive to outliers, a problem not faced by the RC estimator. 7 In addition, GMM-type estimators are not an alternative under T > N for the over-…tting problem. See Bond (2002) . 8 tion is therefore as follows In addition, we deal with between-country dependence, which is believed to happen through the disturbances being E(u it u jt ) 6 = 0. For that we make use of Zellner's (1962) Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) estimator, which presents greater e¢ ciency, the greater the correlation amongst the disturbances. The SUR estimates di¤erent country time series, which are then weighted by the covariance matrix of the disturbances 8 . Moreover, this estimator provides rather insightful estimates because it disaggregates the analysis even further than the pooled analysis, so that we can have a more in-depth view of the hyperin ‡ationary processes at the time 9 . Equation Two
illustrates the equation estimated for each country,
In terms of results, …rstly, in Table Two we report the IPS statistics, and they suggest that we can reject the null hypothesis of unit roots and accept in favour of the alternative that at least one country of each variable is, in fact, stationary. This implies that no further data transformations are needed, and also that cointegration analysis cannot be pursued. 8 An alternative to SUR is the Common E¤ects Estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006) . However, N is assumed to be large and in our data set N=4. Furthemore, Kapoor, M., H. H. Kelejian, et al. (2007) propose an estimator that also works best under the N ! 1 assumption. 9 For a more thorough discussion about panel time-series analysis in general, see Smith and Fuertes (2008). Secondly, in Table Three we In Table Five we In addition, it is worth mentioning that in most of these static and dynamic equations, GOV does not present clear-cut estimates nor statistical signi…cance, which suggests the importance of political regime characteristics, or democracy in this case, as the main determinant of in ‡ation in the region at the time.
Finally, when we disaggregate the analysis further and make use of the SUR estimator that takes into account any between-country dependence present in the data, the story the data are telling does not change much. In the …rst panel of Table Six All in all, the estimates reported above indicate that the process of redemocratisation of the Latin American countries in this sample was followed by high rates of in ‡ation, and even bursts of hyperin ‡ation. Loosely speaking, the introduction of more democratic political institutions seen at the time was somewhat detrimental to macroeconomic stability, at least in terms of in ‡ation rates. Alternatively, it can be said that unequal societies that implement more democratic institutions must make sure that the executive, even when democratically elected, is well constrained, and also introduce sound economic institutions such as a responsible …scal authority and an independent central bank, so that hyperin ‡ation does not occur in the …rst place and stabilisations, when needed, are not delayed. This is particularly important for these Latin American countries, since central bank independence and …scal responsibility rules were implemented well after democrati-We investigated in this paper the role of more democratic regimes in in ‡ation in a panel of Latin American countries that re-democratised in the 1980s.
The results, based on the relatively novel panel time-series analysis, suggest that those countries su¤ered from high rates of in ‡ation and even bursts of hyperin ‡ation right after they re-democratised. Moreover, macroeconomic stabilisations came only after a long and protracted delay. All in all, the populist view of in ‡ation, which predicts that newly elected coalitions coming into power in unequal societies end up generating higher de…cits and, in turn, higher in ‡ation, is con…rmed by the data and analysis conducted here.
The current relevance of carrying out a historical study on the Latin American hyperin ‡ationary experience is that, as we speak, an emerging country like Zimbabwe is su¤ering from hyperin ‡ation. On the one hand, it can be speculated that the Zimbabwean hyperin ‡ation which started in 1999, coincides with the fact that the constraints on the governing party were severely relaxed (e.g. Acemoglu, Johnson and Querubín (2008)). On the other hand, the present analysis can also be inversely related to the South African case, an unequal society indeed, but with a rather strong constitution which constrains the executive, and without much political competition or opposition to the governing party since the democratisation of 1994. In this respect, it can be speculated that the South African government, which has never bowed to populist demands for [re] distribution coming from a weak opposition, has been quite e¢ cient in managing the economy. All the same, the two cases above are illustrative of the fact that developing countries with di¤erent characteristics will not necessarily follow the pattern of Latin America.
Furthermore, the quality of the evidence presented is, to a certain extent, boosted not only because we focus on those rather unequal countries which re-democratised and su¤ered from hyperin ‡ation in Latin America, but also because we use a novel proxy for political regime characteristics based on principal components analysis, which is believed to be a step forward since it reduces model uncertainty and has more explanatory power.
Moreover, we take advantage of the novel panel time-series analysis, which deals with important empirical issues not covered by the previous studies, such as heterogeneity bias in dynamic panels, economic endogeneity and between-country dependence. It is therefore believed that the analysis conducted here represents a step forward in terms of achieving better and more insightful estimates.
Regarding future work, on the one hand, the inclusion of economic inequality would be a welcome development to this analysis. However data on inequality from Peru and Bolivia are fragmented, which somehow precludes a study on the impact of political regime characteristics and inequality on in ‡ation. More realistically, the use of an alternative proxy for 'political consolidation' (e.g. the number of political parties in congress since re-democratisation) would be a feasible alternative to Polity IV variables.
Moreover, with extended time series and information on central bank independence we could interact 'political consolidation'with central bank independence to get a proxy for political and economic maturity which would bring more explanatory power to this analysis.
On the other hand, the Zimbabwean case is certainly worth investigating. The impact of the reduction on the constraints on the executive and the hyperin ‡ationary episode that followed since 1999 should be further analysed. Moreover, the current South African context is of some interest too, since a new political party with some opposition power has been recently created, and can demand from the newly elected government some sort of
[re] distribution. All in all, the analysis of political regime characteristics and economic institutions can be extended to di¤erent cases.
Finally, a comparison of the Latin American case with the Eastern European transition economies would also be of some interest. Some of those countries su¤ered from high rates of in ‡ation during the transition from socialism, however those economies were not as unequal as the Latin American ones.
To conclude, the Latin American hyperin ‡ationary experience is informative because it exempli…es an interesting pattern seen in the region at the time. Unequal societies that re-democratise and which still do not have the 'right political context'or enough political maturity, nor the right economic institutions such as an independent central bank conducting sound monetary policy and a credible …scal authority in place, will end up doing more harm than good in terms of macroeconomic [in] stability, which a¤ects mainly the welfare of the poor. Moreover, those Latin American countries took, roughly speaking, ten years to stabilise, which is also an example of a delayed stabilisation. Macroeconomic stabilisation came only when those countries matured their political regimes, and also when they introduced central bank independence, in ‡ation targeting and …scal responsibility laws in the 1990s 10 . All in all, political liberalisation should be accompanied by some sort of 'political consolidation'and also by the implementation of the right economic institutions.
